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11 Murder for gain 
Commercial insurance and moralities in 
South Africa 
Erik Bahre 
Introduction: moralities of finance 1 
South Africa has a well-developed insurance industry with a wide range of South African companies such as Sanlam, Old Mutual , Metropolitan, Hollard, Liberty Life and ABSA. Historically, not least due to apatiheid, most of the clients belonged to the wealthier white population and business world. But this staiied to change after the first democratic elections of 1994. These commercial insurance companies started to sell a wide range of policies, but especially life insurance, to people living in South Africa's townships and rural areas. They staiied buildin~ new offices, sold insurances through voluntary organisations, churches, local retail 
stores or had sales agents who would go door-to-door (see Bahre 2011, 2012). The marketing practices of these South African insurance companies led to a host of questions and concerns. Jn this chapter I clarify how commercial insur-
ance, especially life insurance, became debated in South Africa. I show how segmented these debates were in that different moral concerns were dominant in different parts of society. This segmentation of debates appears to reflect the eveiyday inequalities, both economic and racial, that still permeate South African society today. While the elite and upper middle classes - predominantly white -
were concerned about fraud and the mismanagement of claims, the poor and lower-middle classes - predominantly black - were concerned with the immoral 
effects that insurance could have on personal relations, especially among kin and 
neighbours. Commercial life insurance made it possible for poor clients to get a 
relatively large sum of cash - without anyone knowing about it - after someone they had a policy on died. This fuelled concerns about insurance murder. Although the new, poorer clients too experienced the mismanagement of their 
claims, these did not enter the public domain. 
Insurance is highly technical and moral in that it raises questions about legiti-
mate entitlements and responsibilities, the boundaries of solidarity and the collectivisation of risks (see Bahre 2011, Baker 2000, Chan 2012, Golomski 2015, Maurer 2005, Zelizer 1978). This chapter explores these moralities and tries to shed light on how within one count1y there can be such a variety of moral concerns. The theoretical importance of examining this diversity is that it shows that financialisation and marketisation have moral dynamics but that these moral 
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dynamics are far from ubiquitous. To some extent, South Africa's financial sector and its clients are witnessing a 'neoliberal morality' as the authors of the intro-duction to this volume point out. At the same time, the moral dynamics are only partly a result of neoliberal ideology. National political transformations and socio-cultural expectations are equally, if not more, important. This chapter explore how clients, particularly the new clients living in Cape Town's town-
ships, navigate the dynamic forces that make up their financial landscape. The expansion of commercial insurance needs to be set against the complex problems that ociety is facing, many of which touch upon finance. South Africa is among the countries with the highe t level of economic inequality in the world. The World Bank estimates that South Africa had a Gini index of 63.4 in 2011 .2 Since the abolishment of apartheid with the first democratic elections of 1994, a lot has changed but the high level of inequality continues to characterise South African society. Corruption also continues to plague South African society. According to Lodge (2002), corruption was a feature of the apartheid era but then it was less about personal gain and more in light of strengthening patronage and Afrikaner nationalism. Corruption continued after the abolishment of apartheid. There was the 1999 South African Aims Deal. In order to get this milita1y procurement package worth clo e to US$5 billion, companies had been paying bribes to several high-powered politicians (Liebenberg and Barnard 2005). Another scandal led to the imprisonment of former National Police Commissioner and Interpol Pre ident Jackie Selebi in 2010 for accepting money from a crime syndicate (Schwella 2013 ). The expansion of commercial insurance 
needs to be seen in the light of these spe:cific complexities. 
The data on which this chapter is based were collected between 1995 and 2014 during several research periods ranging from a few weeks to a year in length -
about three years of fieldwork in total. I have held interviews with actuaries and others working in the insurance induslly in Johannesburg and Cape Town and interviewed people who were othe1wise involved in developing insurance policies, selling policies or managing insurance claims. Mo t of the research was carried out 
among (potential) client in the townships of Cape Town. Almost all of the resi-dents are Xhosa who, with the abo lition of apa1iheid in J 994, left the impoverished Bantustans Ciskei and Transkei to lly to earn an income in the city (see Ross 1999 for a concise hist01y). In addition to interviews, participant observation and other tandard ethnographic re earch methods, I developed two surveys. One was for the 
residents of the townships of Cape Town (n= 110) and contained questions about the use of financial services, trust in financial institutions and networks, concerns about risks and engagement in social networks. A second online survey was carried out among actuaries (n=79) and contained questions on developments in the 
sector, political changes and market oppo1iunities (see also Bahre 2011 , 2012). 
Neoliberalism and democratisation in South Africa 
The 'discovery' of new clients with a low income was at the heart of a chang-ing morality on poverty and finance that emerged internationally and might best 
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be summarised as a neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism profoundly challenged 
stereotypes and ideologies about poverty and finance. The old stereotype of the 
poor can be characterised as a reminiscent of what Oscar Lewis (1959) called 
the 'culture of poverty'. This basically meant that the poor were seen as inca-
pable of handl ing money in a productive way and that culture was an obstacle 
to poverty alleviation. With the rise of the neoliberal ideology, particularly 
since the 1980s, the stereotype changed. The poor were not anymore seen to be 
helpless and their culture, whatever that was, was not anymore perceived as an 
obstacle but as a resource. Neoliberal ideology held that the poor were skilled 
and creative entrepreneurs. It stipulated that if the poor would be presented with 
a wide range of choices, including choices for financial services, they would 
rationally choose what was best for them and use these facilities in such a way 
that they could escape poverty. This new ideology was among others expressed 
by the business guru Prahalad who argues that the poor offer an important busi-
ness case and that business can eradicate poverty. In Fortune at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits Prahalad (2004) develops a 
business case that should open up the so-called BOP (bottom of the pyramid) 
market. 3 This ideology suggested a win-win situation in that financialisation 
was profitable for the financial sector and made it possible for people to escape 
poverty. 
Financial institutions like banks and insurance companies around the world 
came to see the poor as relatively trustworthy and rational entrepreneurs. The 
most widely known and influential case is the Grameen Bank, which Yunus estab-
lished in Bangladesh in the mid- l 970s. The Grameen Bank provided small loans 
to poor women without requesting conventional collateral such as a job or house. 
Instead, collateral had to be ensured through group pressure. 
The belief was that expanding commercialisation and financialisation to the 
poor would bring more harmonious societies. The moral impetus of this develop-
ment became particularly clear when in 2006 Yunus was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize - and not the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The microfinance 
industry challenged the dominant stereotype that the poor were in-esponsible and 
passive and replaced it with a morality that emphasised that financial products 
can rely on the poor's social relations, and that the poor are creative and trust-
worthy entrepreneurs. Over the last twenty to thirty years, microfinance became 
an industry involving billions of dollars, with hundred millions of clients. Studies 
that highlighted the positive impact of microfinance with encouraging titles such 
as The Miracles of Barefoot Capitalism: A Compelling Case for Microcredit 
(Klobuchar and Wilkes 2005) and Money with a Mission: Microfinance and 
Poverty Reduction (Copestake et al. 2005). 
Neoliberal policy had a profound moral dimension, one that has been heavily 
criticised. Elyachar, based on research in Egypt, concluded that one of the key 
transformations of neoliberalist ideology was that 'practices once dismissed as 
"backward" and situations once seen as transitional have become the vanguard of 
entrepreneurial savvy in the global age' (Elyachar 2002: 496). Neoliberal ideol-
ogy ignores the strnctural causes of high levels of inequality in society and 
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defines corporate welfare as public interest (see also Whyte and Wiegratz, intro-
duction to this volume). 
Several scholars have argued that neoliberal ideology has deeply permeated 
South African society, suggesting that today's government policy, society's prob-
lems and economic ontologies are caused by or at least amplified by 
neoliberalism (Bond 2000, Comaroff and Comaroff 200 I, Ferguson 2007). There 
is, however, a tendency to identify neoliberalism too quickly as the cause of 
immorality in South Africa. In South Africa, the moralities of marketisation and 
financialisation frequently point to more government control, in addition to the 
rapid development of a welfare state (Bahre 2011, 20 I 4, 2015). There are clear 
indications that South Africa is not as neoliberal as some would have it that 
immoralities (or rather, moralities underpinning practices regarded as 'bad') do 
not necessarily result from neoliberalism, and that immoralities have additional 
sources (see Bahre 2011, 2015). In short, prevailing moral economies in many 
realms of South African society are the result of very mixed and hybrid moral 
sources of which neoliberalism is only one of many. 
One of the key drivers of marketisation of commercial insurance to the poor 
was political change . Democratisation in South Africa was crucial for the 
'discovery' of tens of millions of new clients. After the abolishment of 
apartheid and the 1994 elections, the South African government emphasised 
that in order to establish social justice, resources had to be redistributed along 
racial lines. The state had to ensure that the previously excluded African popu-
lation has proper jobs, housing, education, be entitled to social grants and gain 
access to financial companies that previously neglected them. They should 
become shareholders of financial companies, and part of the higher ranks of 
employment; thus, financial companies had to develop services for previously 
excluded Africans. The African National Congress (ANC) government for 
instance urged banks to expand their business to the previously disadvantaged 
communities, which meant that they had to establish offices in the townships 
and former Bantustans and lower the bureaucratic requirements for taking on 
new clients." 
Against this background, the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) saw 
the need to change the profession. The political changes that were taking place in 
South Africa made actuaries realise more than ever that their business had to 
change as well. For this purpose, ASSA established 'Actuaries On the Move' in 
2000. Actuaries on the Move had to increase the profession's diversity, among 
others by offering mentoring and training programmes that could support black 
students who wanted to become actuaries. Hilla1y Murashiki, chairman of the 
diversity committee of ASSA publically stated: 'Thanks to a R20 million series 
of initiatives by the Actuarial Society of SA [South Africa] and its sponsors, there 
are today four black South African actuaries and many more to come'. About 60 
per cent of the actuarial students are black, which reveals that a large shift can be 
expected in the future. ; The implication is that in this instance it is not that finance 
creates a particular morality, but that the morality that is part of democratisation 
is changing the South African financial landscape. 
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The Financial Sector Charter on Black Economic Empowe1ment played a 
pivotal role in the transfonnation of a sector that many associated with apartheid 
exploitation and white rule. The charter came into effect in 2004, after the 2002 
financial sector summit organised by NEDLAC (National Economic Development 
and Labour Council), a partnership that represents business, labour and the 
government.6 The financial sector committed itself to increase non-whites in senior 
positions, to support the establishment of black-owned small and medium enter-
prises, and to make it easier for the poor to access financial services.' 
Actuaries as well as others working in the predominantly white-staffed insur-
ance industry were woJTied that if the sector would not transform, government 
legislation would force them to do so in ways that were threatening to the busi-
ness. In 2005, for example, there were persistent rumors that the government 
would establish a national funeral policy and actuaries told me that they feared 
that the government would waste tax payers' money and take profitable business 
away from them. Jn the beginning of 2006, the rumors ofa national funeral policy 
had ceased and the concern was more about the government's plans to establish 
a National Health Insurance, a scheme that had simmered already since democ-
ratisation in 1994 but that became more realistic after 2007 (see Botha and 
Hendricks 2008). Some were worried that the government would take the most 
viable part of the market away from them and thus undermine the insurance 
sector as a whole. They were concerned that a government-run insurance scheme 
would suffer from mismanagement and some were woJTied that politicians would 
use the National Health Insurance to enrich themselves and their family members. 
Here too, national political dynamics had a profound moralising effect on South 
Africa's expanding financial sector. 
Actuaries that were developing policies for the poor were often fairly young, 
around forty years of age, male white South Africans, with degrees from South 
Africa's top universities such as the University of Stellenbosch, University of 
Cape Town, or University of Witwatersrand. Some of the actuaries that I met felt 
that they were part of a new era and they wanted to contribute to a new South 
Africa . As an actuary in his thirties and working for one of South Africa's major 
insurance companies explained to me: 'it is now our time. We are young and we 
do not have the burden of history like the older people working here. We have to 
make something of this country ' . 
Insurance companies sta11ed to establish special branches to develop policies 
for black clients. Today, it is common to see insurance advertising billboards in 
the townships, sometimes even in schools, to find insurance adverts in local 
newspapers that are freely available, and see insurance adverts on television that 
seem to be aimed at African clients in particular. Supermarkets and other stores 
sell insurance, and churches have become particularly popular venues for selling 
policies. My survey in two township in Cape Town showed that 75 per cent of 
the residents had an insurance policy and that some had as many as nine policies . 
Even the poor respondents had policies: 41 per cent of those with incomes under 
Rl000 (about EU€ 100 at the time of the survey) had at least one insurance prod-
uct, usually a funeral policy. 8 
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In short, in South Africa, there was a successful and one might even say 
aggressive marketisation of insurance policies to new clients, predominantly the 
poor and lower-middle classes. This marketisation was due, at least in part, to 
neoliberal ideologies that reframed the poor as successful entrepreneurs, as well 
as a result of democratisation where the government increased its grip on the 
financial sector and enforced racial and economic inclusion. 
Multiple moralities 
It is possible to distinguish two debates about the immorality of insurance in 
South Africa. One of these debates focuses on the insurance companies. The 
debate is about misselling insurance products, immoral investments by insurance 
companies, poor handling of claims, illegal practices and failing to contribute to 
a just society. 
These concerns have found their way in the South African media. Acclaimed 
financial journalist Bruce Cameron regularly wrote about insurance policies in 
Personal Finance, a newspaper section and website that was part oflndependent 
Online. 9 Cameron warned his readers about crooked financial advisers, also those 
selling insurance products. '0 These public debates were about pension and retire-
ment annuities, a type of long-term insurance. Financial journalists reported how 
pension funds charged inappropriate and undisclosed fees or used other illegal 
measures. It has been estimated that inappropriate fees are charged for managing 
pension funds that costs about R3 billion a year (at the time approximately €300 
million) (Fisher-French 2010). 
In 2009, a national scandal emerged involved Old Mutual, one of South 
Africa's larger insurance companies. Old Mutual had invested in Zimbabwean's 
diamond fields, which was at odds with international sanctions against Mugabe's 
repressive regime (Saunders 2007). The insurance company's breach of interna-
tional sanctions led to a Zapiro cartoon that presented Old Mutual as a loyal and 
violent partner of Mugabe's Zanu PF." The company was depicted as sacrificing 
human rights, freedom of press, as well as the rules of the United Nation's 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme that aimed to limit the spread of so 
called 'blood diamonds'. The cartoon below shows the Zimbabwean military 
closely cooperating with the insurance company at the expense of human lives. 
In 2010, South Africa's newspaper Mail and Guardian reported another major 
scandal that involved SA Quantum, a financial services company that was set up 
by the financial industry to sell and administer its financial products. According 
to the newspaper SA Quantum gave R60,000 (approximately €4000) a month to 
the wife of the general secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). It was alleged that in return the general secretary's wife sold finan-
cial products - mainly pension annuities - to the nearly 2 million members of 
COSATU. Once the story was about to become public, SA Quantum's chief exec-
utive officer (CEO) offered the journalist a bribe of R120,000 (approximately 
€8000) if he would not publish the story (Letsoalo 2010, Vavi 2010). The jour-
nalist agreed to meet the CEO and accepted part of the bribe at a parking lot but 
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Figure 11.J Old Mutual's blood diamonds 
Source: © 2009-2015 Zapiro (All Rights Reserved). Printed/used with permission from 
www.zapiro.com. 
did so while filming with a hidden camera. When this became public, allegations 
of corruption by the insurance sector only became stronger." 
This public debate about the immorality of commercial insurance received 
input from financial journalists, ombudsman organisations, the Financial Services 
Board, the Pension Fund Adjudicator as well as court rulings . These public 
debates expressed concerns that resonated with predominantly white and rela-
tively wealthy insurance clients who would read the newspapers that reported 
these practices and could also mobilise ombudsman organisations, financial jour-
nalists or legal institutions to express their concerns. 
These new clients could often not find their way to these institutions (see also 
Bahre 2012). The poor were by-and-large unable to bring their experiences to the 
media attention; they did not have the knowledge and skills to successfully 
submit a complaint to ombudsman organisations; they did not have the means to 
hire a lawyer for judiciary support. This meant that their experiences with 
misselling, the refusal to honour legitimate claims or concerns about illegal finan-
cial deductions did not enter the public domain. The problems that they had with 
the financial products that they bought from the insurance companies, typically 
relatively small funeral policies, remained largely out of sight of policy makers, 
financial sector regulators and others involved in the insurance sector. 
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The second debate was about the impact that insurance, particular funeral 
insurance, had on the personal relations of the person that took out the policy or 
could benefit from the policy. This debate mainly took place among the new 
clients, predominantly black and relatively poor South Africans. Many of the new 
and prospective clients that I interviewed in Cape Town's townships were 
concerned that insurance damaged personal relations, i.e. insurance was seen as 
an opportunity to profit from someone's misfortune. In the survey that I set up 75 
per cent of the respondents agreed or fully agreed with the statement that insur-
ance was a threat to mutual help. In the same survey, one out of six respondents 
said that they personally knew about people being killed in order to cash in on a 
life insurance policy. Three out of four respondents said that they saw how some-
one had registered someone because they !mew that the person might die soon. 
Many were worried that there are people who take out an insurance policy on the 
life of people who look sick. Especially in a country where AIDS is rampant there 
are concerns that there are people who you might not even know personally, or 
with whom you only have a very distant relationship, who could make money on 
your death. In the survey, a vast majority (70 per cent) of the respondents said that 
they saw how people took advantage by registering someone who was not a 
family member. Another 15 per cent said that they saw instances where someone 
pretended that someone was dead in order to get benefits. 
Regisle1· Register 
someone who someone 
is no fornily because you 
member rind know the 
riftcr tlrnt person might 
person dies clic soon 
keep ( most of) 
the money 
Make suJ"e 
someone dies 
so you get 
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Husbund's Wife's People lying P1·etending 
relatives relatives that they someone is 
t1ying to t.:ike trying to t<1ke contributed lo cle<1d in ordel' 
money from money from the funcrnl to get benefits 
beneficiary beneficimy 
Figure 11.2 Funeral: advantages taken 
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The fears associated with the marketisation of commercial life insurance need 
to be set against the high levels of violence in South Africa. South Africa has been 
in the world's top ten of highest intentional murder rates for all but two years 
since 2000. The Western Cape Province, which includes Cape Town, is the 
province with the highest murder rate in the country. 13 Cape Town has recently 
been ranked as the twentieth most violent city in the world.' 4 The townships 
where the respondents live and where new insurance products are being marketed 
are part of the 'Cape Flats'. It is where most of the approximately 4 million 
Capetonians live. Within Cape Town, most crime is concentrated on the Cape 
Flats, in Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Nyanga and Mitchell Plain (Manaliyo 2014: 
597). CrimeStat South Africa makes an aimual top ten of South Africa's police 
precincts with the highest number of reported crimes. The top ten of worst 
precinct is based on statistics from the South African police. Here too, the Cape 
Flats come out very unfavourable. In 2014, six out of ten precincts with the high-
est murder rate in South Africa were on the Cape Flats. In the same year, of the 
precinct that made it to the top ten of South Africa's highest number of attempted 
murders, seven were from the Cape Flats.' -' Such high levels of violence in every-
day life make it much more probable that someone is actually killed in order to 
cash in on insurance money or that rumours on insurance murder circulate widely. 
During one of the interviews a woman told me that she felt it was appropriate 
to hide insurance policies, even from close family, to avoid rumours. She was 
worried that her family would become suspicious of her when they knew that she 
would receive money when they would die, even though the only reason for her 
to have these funeral policies was to ensure that she could contribute to a decent 
and respectable funeral. 16 It is almost impossible to know if a neighbour, 
colleague, family member or anybody else has a funeral policy on one's life and 
might profit from one's death. This invisibility of the material interests in other 
people's lives adds to the moral concerns that people have, moral concerns that 
are regarded by these social groups as much more disruptive to social relations 
i.e. at interpersonal level and much more pressing than corporate insurance fraud 
or corruption that dominates public debates. In short, insurance is believed to be 
moral and immoral at the same time in that it can help people to take respon i-
bility and support the deceased and his/her family as well as be mobilised for 
personal gain at the expense of others." 
The dynamics of moralities 
This chapter shows that the relationship between morality and neoliberalism is 
not so linear in South Africa to the extent that one can talk of a 'neoliberal moral-
ity ' (see introduction for the term). The often-shared view that immorality and 
fraud are a result of neoliberal forces needs to be nuanced. Neoliberalism ideol-
ogy promoted the marketisation of financial products to the poor on a global scale 
and this might have driven, at least to some extent, the expan ion of the South 
African insurance market to predominantly black lower and middle classes. These 
neoliberal forces, however, should not be overestimated and the definition of 
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neoliberalism should not become so overarching that it becomes a pseudonym for 
capitalism. 
South Africa is a capitalist society with an expanding financial market, but this 
expansion cannot be narrowed down to neoliberalism. This is particularly salient 
when examining the politics of post-I 994 South Africa. The political ideology 
centred on democratisation, inclusive citizenship and overcoming racial equality. 
Over the past twenty years, the South African government has increased its 
control over consumer finance and has enforced a wide range of policies and laws 
on the financial sector. Marketisation in South Africa is driven by these political 
ideologies, which leads to an at-times contradictory moral landscape. This land-
scape includes ideological reorientations of the poor that are part of 
neoliberalism, basically the view that the poor are not passive people but ener-
getic entrepreneurs, as well as the political ambition to have more control over the 
financial sector that has to contribute to a more-equal society. The expansion of 
the South African insurance market was intimately connected to these two moral-
ities: one moral framework that can be traced to a global neoliberal ideology 
where business interest were seen to coalesce with a humanitarian agenda and one 
that was deeply rooted in the establishment of a democratic South Africa. 
This diversity is apparent when examining clients, both old and new, white and 
black, wealthy and poor. Their moral agendas reflect the economic and racial 
inequalities that still permeate South African society. The predominantly white 
elites and upper-middle classes are concerned about fraud by insurance compa-
nies. They are worried about how insurance companies charge illegal fees, that 
they break international treaties regarding investments and that they do not have 
the interests of clients at heart. They are able to voice their criticisms through 
national media, ombudsman organisations and legal actions against the insurance 
companies. 
The new and predominantly poor and black clients have their own concerns. 
They too have problems with their insurance but these are different kinds of prob-
lems, often from different kinds of policies. Furthermore, the moral debates not 
only centre on the insurance companies. They pay attention to the ambiguous 
consequences that insurance policies, especially life insurance, have on kinship 
and neighbourhood relations. Many recognise that insurance helps to overcome 
adversities and makes it possible to offer help, but they see also a darker side to 
insurance. To them, the marketisation of life insurance reveals that mutual 
support is declining and that it has become possible to make money on the death 
of others. 
The challenge is to gain insight into the multiplicity of moralities. This multi-
plicity features in two ways. First, moralities are pegged to multiple economic 
regimes, in this particular case both to neoliberal understandings of poverty, as 
well as expectations of the financial sector in an emerging democracy. Instead of 
studying a single financial or economic origin of morality one needs to unravel, 
through detailed empirical studies of actual financial practices, how moralities 
emerge when several economic regimes intersect and interact. Second, different 
groups in society have different concerns and even more so different priorities. 
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The high levels of inequality that continue to characterise South African society 
today have resulted in a skewed public discourse about the morality of financi al 
practices. The concerns of people who are wealthier and better educated are 
heard much easier than those of the poor and uneducated. The ways in which 
moralities are defined in public debates , economic policies, as well as judiciary 
measures, are not always inclusive. These inequalities, particularly so in South 
Africa, mean that some concerns about the financial sector receive more atten-
tion than others. 
The inequalities that characterise society - which can be economic, racial, 
gendered and so on - need to be approached reflexively when defining fraud and 
corruption. If one fails to do so, definitions of fraud and corruption might end up 
reflecting the interests and world views of specific, usually more powerful, 
groups in society. Seemingly universal claims about what constitutes fraud , 
corruption and injustice might actually reflect very particular interest and world 
views that gloss over the experiences of people living at the fringes of the global 
capitalist system. 
Notes 
I wou ld like to express my gratitude to Jorg Wiegratz and David Whyte for their very 
helpful and inspiring feedback on earlier versions of this chapter. 
2 The data are presented on the site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. 
3 Prahalad ranks eighth in the Financial Times' Top 50 'Most important living man age-
ment thinkers'; twelfth in the Thinkers Top 50, 2003 ; and twenty-third in the Top 50 
of Management Gurus. 
4 The Zantsi account is an example of a new type of bank account especially made to 
cater to the need s of the poor. It appears to be relatively successful. 
5 Lloyd Coutts, black actuaries are on their way, says Assa, in a business report, 22 
January 2006 (www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleJd=3076460). See Bahre (2012). 
6 The charter can be found on the financial sector council's website 
www.fscbarter.co.za. 
7 www.treasu1y.g0v.za/press/otber/2003 l 0170 l .pdf. 
8 FinScope 2003 states that almost nobody earning below Rl 000 a month has a policy. 
Because the study on which the FinScope data is based is unavailable, even though 
the study was publicly fund ed by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), the reason for this vast discrepancy remains unclear. See Bahre (2011 ). 
9 He was awarded a Sanlam Award for Excellence in Financial Journalism 2009, wl1ich 
was the twelfth year that he received this award. See www.sanlam.co.za/wps/wcm/ 
connect/ san lam_ en/Sanlam/Sponsorships/Media/Financial +.I ourna Ii sm+ Awards/ 
Previous+Winners. 
10 See www.roylaw.co.za/home/article/protectyourfamily/pageid/insurance. 
11 See www.mg.co.za/zapiro/fullcartoon/2337. 
12 At the same time, insurance con.1panies are pointing out that their clients can be fraud-
ulent . According to a Standard Bank report issued in 2011, consumers are submitting 
fraudulent claims that are estimated to cost about R3 billion a year (at the time about 
€300 million). See Mail a11d Guardian, http: //mg.co.za/arlicle/201 l-05-02-insurance-
fraud-costs-consumers. 
13 Based on statistics provided by the South African Police Service, which can be found 
on line at www.saps.gov.za/resource _ centre/publications/s tatistics/crimestats/2015/ 
crime_ stats.php. 
M11rde1; insurance and moralities in South Aji-ica 153 
14 Ranking compiled by Mexico's Citizens' Council for Public Security and Criminal 
Just ice, see www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/view.download/5/ 177. 
Violence in South Africa is not limited to murder but murder is the most relevant 
crime in relation to funeral insurance. 
15 www.crimestatssa.com/topten.php. The six precincts with the highest murder rates 
were Nyanga, Harare, Mitchells Plain, Gugulethu, Khayelit ha and Delft. The seven 
precincts with the highest number of attempted murders were Mitchells Plain, Elsies 
River, Nyanga, Bishop Lavis, Manenburg, Khayelitsha and Mfuleni. 
16 Similar moral concerns about life insurance were also crucial when life insurance 
became popular in nineteenth-century America (Zelizer 1978), and insurance murder 
is st ill a popular theme for many novels and film s. 
17 It is important to note that there already existed informal insurance arrangements in 
the form of burial societies. These societies mainly offered services and sometimes 
cash to the bereaved. The rules and procedure were regularly discussed at meetings 
where the members would discuss the legitimacy of claims and entitlements (see 
Bahre 2007). The benefits from commercial life insurance are much less visible than 
those from burial societies, which opens up more space for speculations. 
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12 Economic freedom mis-sold 
N eoliberalism and the moral economies 
of the PPI scandal in the UK 
David Ellis 
Introduction 
In May 2011, the British Bankers Association (BBA) withdrew its appea l to the 
High Court contesting the regulatory measures taken by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) for the redress of 
consumers in what was judged to be the inappropriate sales of payment protec-
tion insurance (PPI) (Grey 2011). The decision taken by the BBA marked the end 
of six-year standoff between the banking industry and regulators following a 
'super-complaint' made by the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) to the Office for 
Fair Trading (OFT) in 2005. During this period, the FSA repeatedly found that 
lenders were in breach of regulatory principles in the sales of PPI, resulting in 
final notices, public censure and fines amounting to £12,619,700 for firms found 
to have contravened these principles (Ashton and Hudson 2013). 
Despite these attempts to curb what was seen as an intractable problem within 
the industry, PPI complaints to the FOS surged from 1,315 to 104,597 between 
2006 and 2011 (Ferran 2012). With the failure of the BBA's attempt to overturn 
the actions taken by the FSA, the PPI scandal has come at a massive cost to the 
banking industry, with £20.5 billion being paid out in consumer redress since 
201 1 as a result of the rnis-sold PPI (Financial Conduct Authority 2015). 
However, despite the industrial scale of financial wrongdoing, the term 'fraud' 
has been conspicuous by its absence throughout the various regulatory investiga-
tions and legal wranglings of the PPI mis-selling saga. 
The lack of reference to 'fraud' indicates an unwillingness on the part of 
regulators to openly submit such conduct to the social censure of either criminal or 
moral opprobrium. This failure to acknowledgment of PPI 'mis-selling' as wrong-
doing raises significant questions about the nonns and practices underpitrning the 
provision of PPI. lt is the intention of this chapter to explore these questions through 
an understanding of ' moral economy' (Sayer 2007; Wiegratz 2012). In the first half 
of the chapter, an examination of the normative practices and values of the PPI 
scandal will consider the legitirnations for these norms within the context of neolib-
eralism. This will include assessing neoliberal regulatory policies and the rights and 
responsibilities of both financial institutions and consumers, characterised by the 
ideals of 'freedom of contract' and 'economic freedom' (Atiyah 1990). 
